An alternative conception of the “external world” is provided by G.E. Drawing on ‘Proof of an External World’, and Moore’s argument in ‘A Defense of Common Sense’, suggest what lessons (if any) we can draw about the relationship between philosophy and common sense. There is an enormous literature on Moore's so-called “proof”per se, but practically nothing has been written on the distinctions upon which the proof is bases, such as “being presented in space” and “being met with in space”. r 137 PROOF OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD E BERKELEY to the aoreed b … The Proof Strategy 1. A warm-up: Is the square of an odd integer always odd? Moore’s Proof of an External World and the Problem of Skepticism. THE PARADOX OF MOORE’S PROOF OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD B A C Moore’s proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. G.E. 127-9 • In the Preface to the 2nd Edition of the Critique, Kant thought it a scandal to philosophy that until now no-one had proved the existence of an external world, but this had to be accepted on faith. Moore, in his celebrated “Proof of an External World” (1959b). What is meant by ‘external world’? G. E. Moore – Proof of an External World Page 1 of 6 G. E. Moore – Proof of an External World Jottings pp. The aim of this paper is to assess Moore"s Proof of an external world, in light of recent interpretations of it, namely Crispin Wright"s (1985) and James Pryor"s (unpublished). IT SEEMS TO ME THAT, so far from its being true, as Kant declares to be his opinion, that there is only one possible proofofthe existence of things outside shadows) - Not the same as ‘things presented in space’ 2. External things Things external to us Things external to our mind - Things to be met with in space - Not the same as ‘physical object’, ‘material object’, ‘bodies’ (e.g. Moore, “Proof of an External World” 1. Neither Dogma nor Common Sense: Moore's Confidence in His 'Proof of an External World'. Paul Forster - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):163 – 195. The first was a proof that two human hands existed at the time when I gave the proof; the second was a proof … proof differs in important respects from the sort of proof I gave just now that there were two hands existing then. Moore devotes most of that paper to characterizing the category of external things, or “things to be met with in space.” This phrase, Moore writes, is … I have, then, given two conclusive proofs of the existence of external objects. Moore’s Proof of an External World. In the first section I will present Moore’s original proof In “Proof of an External World,”1 G. E. Moore claims to give a rigorous proof of the existence of an external world, as an alternative to Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism.” The Proof proceeds as follows: after some preliminaries concerning what one might mean by an external object, Moore holds up one hand MOORE: SELECTED WRITINGS 9 PROOF OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD In the Preface to the second edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason some words occur, which, in Professor Kemp Smith's translation, are rendered as follows: I argue that neither Wright’s nor Pryor’s readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Moore’s “proof” can we draw about philosophical skepticism? Just Begging the Question Annalisa Coliva, New York The aim of this paper is to assess Moore’s Proof of an external world, in light of recent interpretations of it, namely Crispin Wright’s (1985) and James Pryor’s (unpublished). These are crucial to Proof of an External World * G. E. MOORE G. E. Moore (1873—1958) spent his entire career at Cambridge University, and wrote important works in ethics, free will, and epistemology. View Notes - Moore - Proof of an External World.pdf from PHI 2010 at University of Central Florida.